§ 06AI integration risk assessment
This section assesses the integration risks specific to the Q2 2026 onboarding platform program (project code WM-OPS-401) as currently scoped per the program PRD rev. 0.4 dated 18 February 2026. Scope statements in the PRD have been mapped against the findings and gap-fillers above. Risks are characterized by likelihood (in the AI-deployed configuration) and consequence.
| Risk | Source | Likelihood | Consequence | Class |
| AI-assisted compliance approval signs cases under one definition of "approved" while downstream systems consume another |
F-01, F-07 |
High |
Audit findings; potential restatement of approval records |
High |
| Free-text instructions in Additional Notes silently overridden by AI workflow |
F-02 |
High |
Wrong-action outcomes in ≈6% of cases; client-facing errors |
High |
| Loss of senior compliance operator within program window without elicitation of tacit decision rules |
F-03, GF-04, GF-15 |
High |
Program retraining required mid-deployment; operational gap |
High |
| AI false-positive triage trained against any single one of three observed resolution paths |
F-04, GF-02, GF-12 |
High |
Throughput regression; audit-trail inconsistency |
Med |
| AI workflow proceeds during quarter-end without the supplemental review sweep |
F-05, GF-07 |
Med |
Re-emergence of duplicate-approval class historically caught by Sue M.'s queue |
Med |
| RM territory tie-breaks coupled to AI assignment without monthly meeting input |
F-06, GF-08 |
Med |
RM revenue disputes; assignment churn |
Low |
| Off-channel email loops not represented in workflow state, leading to AI premature progression |
F-08, GF-06 |
Med |
Cases progress before required human input received |
Med |
| KYC vendor confidence scores binarized at AI input boundary |
F-11 |
Low |
Loss of upstream signal that could inform AI confidence |
Low |
Aggregated assessment
The Q2 program in its current form is, in our judgment, likely to deliver against its throughput and cost-reduction objectives while introducing a class of consistency and audit risks that will require remediation in flight. The program's risk profile is meaningfully improved if the recommendations in § 07 are completed before the platform's compliance-approval and false-positive-triage components reach production.
We do not recommend cancelling the program. We recommend separating the high-confidence components (document re-keying, document-format normalization, vendor-data ingestion — gap-fillers GF-01, GF-13, GF-14) from the components that depend on contested semantics (compliance approval, false-positive triage, free-text instruction handling — gap-fillers GF-02 — GF-04, GF-06, GF-12, GF-15). The first set can proceed against the current documentation. The second set requires the PRISM work described in R-01.